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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GOLD'S GYM and TROY PETERSON 
& ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
CaseNo.20010510-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Judgment of Dismissal was entered May 11, 200L (R. 151-149). The 30 day 
deadline for appeal (Utah R. App. P. 4(a)) fell on June 10, a Sunday. Plaintiff filed his 
Notice of Appeal on the following business day, June 11, 2001 (R. 156-155.) The appeal 
was timely. Utah R. App. P. 22(a). Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996), because the appeal is one over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original jurisdiction. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Was a lease for "the premises" located at a strip mall ambiguous as to whether "the 
premises" included substantial interior improvements not yet even designed nor under 
construction, and which would need to be custom designed for that particular tenant, and was 
the lease therefore unenforceable for lack of mutual assent? Whether a contract is ambiguous 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. CrooL 980 P.2d 
685,686 (Utah 1999). This issue is the main focus of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 120-113.) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellant does not contend that there are constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action for 
breach of a real estate lease agreement. 
B. Course of proceedings and disposition below. 
Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint on August 25, 1998. (R. 8-1.1) Plaintiff filed 
an Amended Complaint on August 21,2000. (R. 72-64.) The case was tried to the bench 
on December 12,2000. (R. 88-87.) On January 24,2001, the court issued its ruling finding 
that plaintiff had not sustained his burden. (R. 120-113.) The formal Findings of Fact and 
!The documents in the trial court record are organized in reverse chronological order, with 
the result that the numbering placed on the documents pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure runs in reverse order on each document. 
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Conclusions of Law (R. 148-143) and a Judgment of Dismissal (R. 151-149) were entered 
May 11,2001. 
Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2001. (R. 156-155.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
James Nielsen undertook to construct and develop a strip mall at approximately 1340 
East Center Street in Spanish Fork, Utah. (Tr. 16, 28-29, 79.) During the construction, 
Nielsen placed signs on the building advertising it for lease. (Tr. 16.) Troy Peterson, the 
manager for Gold's Gym (Tr. 96), contacted Nielsen and expressed interest in leasing a 
portion of the property. (Tr. 97,16.) 
At the time of Peterson's initial contact with Nielsen, the zoning on the property did 
not permit the construction of a health club. (Tr. 30.) In order to seek a zoning change, 
Nielsen explained to Peterson that he needed to have a lease in place to show that Peterson 
was serious in his desire for the property. (Tr. 32,99.) Nielsen obtained a preprinted lease 
form at a business store, attached an addendum, and presented it to Peterson, who signed the 
document. (Tr. 33, 67, 100.) The addendum attached to the lease stated the lease was 
subject to the zoning being changed from C-l to C-2. (Exhibit 1.) Nielsen obtained the 
necessary zoning change on October 21, 1997. (Tr. 13.) The lease stated the lease term 
would begin November 1, 1997. (Ex. 1.) 
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On August 18, 1997, when the lease was signed, the premises were not ready for 
occupancy, but the construction had progressed to the point where Peterson could have begun 
installing tenant improvements. (Tr. 37,39.) Because of the possibility that some plumbing 
and electrical wiring might need to be placed in the concrete floor, the contractor 
constructing the building shell delayed finishing the floor so the improvements could be 
placed in the floor. (Tr. 80.) Although the shell was not totally completed by November 1, 
the date of possession under the lease, it was ready for tenant improvements on that date. (Tr. 
80.) 
After signing the lease, Peterson asked Nielsen for the name of someone who could 
design and build the interior. Nielsen put Peterson in contact with Buck Robinson, the 
contractor who was building the shell. Robinson, in turn, referred Peterson to John Rather, 
an architect. (Tr. 18.) Peterson met with Rather at the construction site in Spanish Fork and 
gave directions as to what he wanted in his gymnasium. (Tr. 74.) Rather prepared a set of 
architectural plans and delivered them to Peterson. (Tr. 77.) Peterson paid for the plans. 
(Tr. 76.) At no time during the process did Rather have any contact with Nielsen and never 
met him prior to trial. Nielsen did not participate in any way in drafting the plans. (Tr. 77.) 
Based on the architectural plans, Buck Robinson, the general contractor building the 
shell, prepared an estimate for the tenant improvements at the request of Peterson. Nielsen 
did not participate in any way in the preparation of the estimate. (Tr. 82.) Robinson 
estimated the cost of tenant improvements at $168,047.00. (Tr. 82, Exhibits 14 and 15.) 
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After receiving the bids, Peterson told Nielsen the bids were too high and he could not afford 
to construct the interior. (Tr. 20.) 
The lease states the lease is for f,the premises" located in Spanish Fork, Utah, 
"described as A Strip Mall at 1341 E Center Spanish Fork, UT 84660." (Exhibit 1.) The 
parties did not discuss who would pay for the tenant improvements until after the cost 
estimates were received. (Tr. 133.) At the time the lease was signed, Nielsen understood 
that the lease obligated him to deliver a building shell only. (Tr. 67.) Peterson testified at 
trial that his understanding at the time of the lease was that Nielsen was going to pay for the 
improvements. (Tr. 101.) There was no testimony concerning any discussion of that issue 
prior to receiving the cost estimate. 
After discovering that Peterson was anticipating breaching the lease because he could 
not afford the tenant improvements, Nielsen started to look for ways to mitigate his potential 
damages. (Tr. 50, 54.) Peterson failed to make the payment due November 1, so Nielsen 
contacted him and explained that he (Nielsen) needed the payments so he could continue his 
payments on the structure. (Tr. 19.) Peterson made excuses to avoid payment (Id.) 
When it became evident that Peterson was not going to fulfill his obligations under 
the lease, Nielsen proposed a modified lease which lowered the rental amount and provided 
that Nielsen would pay $50,000.00 of the tenant improvement costs. (Tr. 50,54, Exhibit 13.) 
Nielsen prepared this proposed new lease and signed it on January 27,1998. (Tr. 51.) After 
Peterson refused to sign, Nielsen entered into a new lease with Jimmy Zufelt, the owner of 
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World's Gym, on February 4,1998. (Tr. 58, Exhibit 17.) Because World's Gym was aware 
of Nielsen's financial predicament, Nielsen was required to make substantial concessions 
from the terms he had with Peterson, including reducing the rent to 77 cents per square foot, 
offering six months free rent, and paying half of the costs of the improvements. (Tr. 25, 56, 
58, Exhibit 17.) 
Nielsen testified without contradiction that his damages from breach of the lease were 
at least $112,700.00, consisting of lost rent of $8,500.00 per month from November, 1997, 
through September, 1998 (when World's Gym began making rent payments) and a deficiency 
of $800.00 per month thereafter through the remaining term of the Peterson lease. (Tr. 23-
27, Exhibits 6, 7, 8.) In addition, Nielsen was required to pay utility bills to Spanish Fork 
City which should have been paid by Peterson. (Tr. 28, Exhibit 10.) The lease also required 
Peterson to pay Nielsen's attorney fees. (Tr. 29, Exhibit 1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The first focus in determining whether a contractual term is ambiguous must be to 
review the entire agreement with a view to harmonizing all its terms. Of the two possible 
meanings the trial court ascribed to "the premises," the only one which was internally 
consistent with, and which would permit the enforcement of, the entire contract was to equate 
"the premises" with the building shell under construction when the lease was signed. The 
other potential interpretation, to define "the premises" as including unspecified tenant 
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improvements, would have been too uncertain to be enforced and should have been rejected 
as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
CONSTRUED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH 
THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT, THE PHRASE "THE PREMISES" 
UNAMBIGUOUSLY REFERRED TO THE BUILDING SHELL ONLY. 
The issue presented in this case in is whether the phrase "the premises" in a real estate 
lease refers to the premises existing and under construction at the time of the lease, or 
whether it refers to premises as yet unplanned and yet unconstructed. For the reasons 
explained below, this court should hold that the phrase Mthe premises" must refer to the 
premises existing and under construction at the time the lease was signed. Any other 
interpretation of the lease would violate established rules of contract construction. 
The trial court cited a Black's Dictionary definition of "premises" to assert that it is 
"an elastic and inclusive term, and it does not have one definite and fixed meaning." (R. 116 
n. 6, citing Blacks [sic] Law Dictionary, 6th ed.)2 While that may be true as a generic 
2
 The current version of Black's gives the applicable definition of "premises" as "A 
house or building, along with its grounds." Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (7th ed. 1999). 
One court explained the original meaning of the word "premises" as follows: 
We next come to the word "premises." The word in its 
legal use originally described the first of the eight parts of a 
deed, viz., all which preceded the habendum. The object of this 
part of the deed was to rightly name the feoffer and the feoffee, 
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statement, the courts have given the term a fixed meaning in specific contexts. In Deich v. 
Reeves, 48 S.E.2d 373, 375 (Ga. 1948), the court held: "While the term 'premises' has 
varying meanings, which usually must be determined by the context, yet, when used in a 
lease of realty without qualifying words, it has been held by the weight of authority to mean 
land and buildings, lands and tenements, land and its appurtenances, etc.M 
It is generally held that "[i]n the absence of an express covenant or stipulation binding 
him so to do, the landlord is under no obligation to put the demised premises in any particular 
condition." Davis v. Stewart 154 P.2d 447,448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). "[N]o duty is owed 
by a landlord... to prepare the premises for the use of the tenant." Strecker v. Barnard. 240 
P.2d 345, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). "[TJhere is no implied covenant on the part of the 
landlord that the demised premises are fit for the purposes for which they are rented or for 
the particular use for which they are intended by the tenant..., and this is true even though 
and to comprehend the certainty of the lands to be conveyed by 
the feoffment. Co. Litt. 6a. It is very easy to see how from this 
meaning of the word it came to designate the lands. A large part 
of the portion of the deed thus named was taken up with the 
description of the lands; hence the word "premises," in the latter 
part of the deed, was used as meaning the lands only; as, for 
instance, "the above-described premises." In this way the word 
has come into general use with the meaning "lands," affording 
an instance, among many others, of the tendency to use a 
general and indefinite word, rather than one of precise and 
definite meaning. 
Rouse v. Catskill &N.Y. Steam-Boat Co.. 13N.Y.S. 126,128(Super. 1891),a£Td, 133 N.Y. 
679, 31 N.E. 623 (1892). 
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the landlord knows the purpose for which the tenant intends to use the premises.'* 51C C.J.S. 
Landlord & Tenant § 304. 
As the trial court correctly noted, there must be a meeting of the minds in order for 
there to be an enforceable contract. Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 
373 (Utah 1996). But, because it would be so easy after the fact to adjust testimony to what 
each party then wanted the result to be,3 the determination of whether there has been a 
meeting of the minds must follow established rules. The court must to look at what the 
parties said and did, not what each privately thought. Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 
219 P. 539,541-42 (1923) (the law "judges of his intentions by his outward expressions and 
excludes all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his words or acts, judged by 
a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree to the matter in question, that agreement 
is established, and it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind 
upon the subject.M); Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group. 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1993) 
3For example, Peterson claimed at trial that he did not intend the lease to be binding and 
that he had no authority to sign a lease for Golds Gym. (Tr. 99-103.) The trial court properly 
recognized this as testimony created after the fact: 
For someone who had no authority, and for someone who 
believed he was under no contract obligation, Peterson did some 
strange things. He signed a lease, advertised the opening of the 
premises by mailing fliers to county residents, and spent $3,000 
on specialized architectural plans. His actions suggest that even 
he believed that a deal had been reached. 
(R. 117.) 
9 
("Unexpressed intentions do not affect the validity of a contract."); Hotel Riviera. Inc. v. 
Torres. 632 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Nev. 1981) ("The making of a contract depends not on the 
agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs-
not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.") 
(citation omitted, italics in original). 
A related rule is that a party will not be permitted to contradict the unambiguous terms 
of a document. "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies." Interwest Construction v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). The determination of whether a document is 
ambiguous is a question of law for the court. RL, 923 P.2d at 1358 (Utah 1996). "When 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995). The evidence 
must, however, have been in existence at the time the document was signed. Year gin. Inc. 
v. Auditing Division. 2001 UT 11, ffif 39, 42, 20 P.3d 287. 
The court should first determine whether the meaning of the term can be ascertained 
from the four corners of the document. Central Florida Investments. Inc. v. Parkwest 
Associates. 2002 UT 3, % 12 (citation omitted). "Where questions arise in the interpretation 
of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document itself. It should be looked 
at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given effect 
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insofar as that is possible." Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357,363 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, the court should 
adopt a construction which will give effect to the whole document and not result in defeating 
the validity of the document. Central Florida Investments, supra; Engle v. First National 
BankofChuewater. 590 P.2d 826,831 (Wyo. 1979) ("The law does not favor the destruction 
of contracts on the ground of indefiniteness, and if it be feasible the court will so construe 
the agreement so as to carry into effect the reasonable intention of the parties if that can be 
ascertained."). 
Here, the post-contract testimony of the parties concerning their unexpressed 
intentions at the time of contract was at odds. Nielsen testified his understanding when he 
and Peterson each signed the Commercial Lease was that Nielsen's obligation was only to 
provide the building shell which was then under construction. Peterson testified his 
understanding was that Nielsen was going to pay for additional improvements. Viewed in 
the light of the principles of contract construction restated above, however, this "conflict" in 
the evidence did not prevent enforcement of the lease.4 The trial court erred in treating this 
case as presenting a factual dispute, because the principles on contract construction resolve 
the issue as one of law. 
4As the trial court properly recognized, "improvements were not even discussed until well 
after the contract had been signed. This fact precludes the possibility that some oral 
understanding was reached at the time of contract execution as to payment for the 
improvements." (R. 115.) 
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A review of the four corners of the document in light of established law permits only 
the conclusion that Mthe premises" meant the building shell which was existing and under 
construction at the time the document was signed. The only "premises" in existence at the 
time the lease was signed consisted of the building shell. At the time the lease was signed, 
"the premises" could have only referred to what was there. Although the shell was not yet 
completed, there was a contract in place for the construction of the shell and the work was 
in progress. Any uncertainty as to what constituted the building shell could have been 
resolved by reviewing the construction contract. 
In contrast, defining "the premises" to include improvements would result in an 
unenforceable contract. On August 17, 1997, when the lease was signed, the anticipated 
tenant improvements had not even been designed. A contract is not enforceable unless its 
terms are reasonably certain. One of the fundamental requirements for the enforceability of 
a contract is that its terms be certain enough to provide the basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy. Candland v. Oldrovd. 67 Utah 605, 609, 248 P. 1101, 1103 (1926). If this 
minimum standard of certainty is not met, there is no contract at all. Brown's Shoe Fit Co. 
v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357, 365 n .8 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
Had "the premises" included an obligation to construct tenant improvements, there 
would have been no way to determine with any certainty what improvements should be 
installed. Although the trial court was concerned that the dollar cost of the tenant 
improvements was such a large item that one would have expected the lease to assign 
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responsibility for those improvements, it would be even more implausible to imagine that the 
parties intended Peterson to have a blank check obligating Nielsen to construct whatever 
improvements Peterson happened to want. The cost of the improvements would have 
consumed more than half of the total rents over the three-year term of the lease. Conversely, 
if tenant improvements were part of the contract, one cannot imagine Peterson being satisfied 
with Nielsen constructing only those improvements which Nielsen wanted to pay for. 
It is evident from the trial court's ruling that the court found the parties intended to be 
bound by the lease agreement.5 In determining what that agreement was, the court is 
required to adopt a construction which will make the contract enforceable, and to reject a 
construction which will defeat enforceability. The only construction of the contract which 
satisfies this rule is to define "the premises" to mean the shell which was under construction 
at the time the contract was signed. 
The trial court was concerned that "the cost of the improvements, $ 168,000, is so large 
that no reasonable person can believe the parties reached an enforceable agreement on all 
essential lease terms without the contract containing a clear statement as to who would bear 
that expense." (R. 116.) The trial court's concern for Peterson violates this Court's policy 
to not paternalistically interfere with the freedom of contract. "It is a long-standing rule in 
Utah that persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without 
5
"[Peterson's] actions suggest that even he believed that a deal had been reached." (R. 
117.) 
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the intervention of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain." Hal 
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). If Peterson really 
expected Nielsen to provide tenant improvements according to Peterson's subsequent design 
and whim, it certainly would have been prudent for Peterson to state that in the contract 
addendum. In light of the rule that a landlord has no responsibility to provide any 
improvements for the tenant, however, it was error for the trial court to hold the contract 
unenforceable merely because it imprudently failed to spell out everything the law implied. 
The trial court also gave undue emphasis to the contract provision (Ex. 1, 1 3) 
requiring the tenant to repair "electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any 
other system or equipment upon the premises" and to return them "in as good condition as 
received, normal wear and tear excepted." The trial court opined that this indicated it was 
Nielsen's obligation to provide improvements. (R. 116n. 5.) The same paragraph, however, 
also requires the tenant to maintain the "plate glass" but there was no evidence of any plate 
glass installed or contemplated. Under the trial court's reading of paragraph 3, the landlord 
would be required to provide plate glass just so the tenant could maintain it. The proper 
interpretation of paragraph 3 is that the tenant was required to maintain any such 
improvements "received." It did not impose on the landlord any obligation to provide the 
specified improvements. In fact, paragraph 4 of the contract contemplates the tenant will 
install improvements, after obtaining the landlord's consent. 
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Contract construction rules required the trial court to look first at what the parties 
actually said and signed, and to determine the meaning of the contract from a review of the 
entire document. Because interpreting the document to require the landlord to install 
unspecified improvements would void the contract for uncertainty, the court was required 
to reject that potential interpretation. The only reasonable interpretation was that the lease 
was for the premises existing and under construction at the time it was signed. The contract 
was enforceable, and Nielsen was entitled to damages for Peterson's breach of the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's conclusion that there was no contract should be reversed. Because 
Peterson never contradicted the damages claimed by Nielsen, the case should be remanded 
with instructions to enter judgment for Nielsen for the damages proved at trial. 
DATED this J^ f day of March, 2002. 
DON R. PETERSEN and Q 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this _i^Tday of March, 2002. 
Brian C. Harrison 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
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APPENDIX "A" 
RULING (R. 120-113) 
* 
FILED o 
Fourth Judicial District! < 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
^ e p u t y 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GOLDS GYM and TROY 
PETERSON & ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 980405353 
DATED: JANUARY 24,2001 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This matter came to trial on December 12,2000, on plaintiffs complaint for 
breach of contract. I now issue this ruling, finding that plaintiff has not sustained 
his burden in this case. 
FACTUAL FINDINGS 
I find that the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
1. Sometime before August 18,1997, Golds Gym manager Troy Peterson 
(Peterson) approached James Nielsen (Nielsen) about the possibility of leasing 
property that had been advertised for rent. 
2. On August 18, 1997, Peterson and Nielsen signed a document entitled 
"Commercial Lease" which provides that the lessor Nielsen leases to "Golds Gym 
& Troy Peterson & Associates" "the premises" located in a "Strip Mall at 1341 
East Center Spanish Fork, UT 84660" for $0.85* per square foot per month for 
three years. At the time of signing, the strip mall was undergoing construction. 
3. At the time the document was signed, the subject property was zoned 
CI, a classification that did not allow for the operation of a health club and gym. 
4. Shortly after it was executed, the signed lease was provided to the city 
zoning commission which granted a zoning change that would accommodate the 
operation of a gym on the premises. 
5. In September 1997, Peterson had flyers printed up and mailed 
throughout the community announcing the opening of a new Golds Gym. The flyer 
indicated the new gym would be located at the strip mall described above and 
would be open in November 1997. 
6. Peterson met twice with John Rather, an architect, who drew up plans 
for interior improvements according to Peterson's specifications. Peterson paid 
John Rather for these plans. 
7. The architectural plans were submitted to Buck Robinson of KBR 
construction who gave a cost estimate for the proposed improvements. 
8. A dispute then arose over who would pay for the tenant improvements. 
1
 The contract actually says .85 cents. This is merely a typographical error and the 
contract should be reformed to say $0.85. 
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Each party wanted the other to pay the entire cost of the improvements. Sometime 
later, Nielsen offered to pay half of the improvements, but Peterson refused. 
9. As a result of this dispute, Golds Gym never moved into the premises 
and paid nothing to Nielsen. 
10. When Golds Gym neither moved in nor paid for the lease space, Nielsen 
sent a notice terminating the lease. 
11. Thereafter Nielsen and Peterson continued to negotiate concerning a 
possible lease of the premises by Golds Gym. 
12. Nielsen eventually rented the subject premises to another entity at a 
price of $0.77 a square foot, with six months free rent, and after paying for half of 
the tenant improvements. 
13. Nielsen now seeks expectation damages against Golds Gym based on 
the terms of the August 18,1997 Commercial Lease. 
14. Peterson claims he is not authorized to bind Golds Gym to a contract as 
Golds Gym is a dba of a Utah corporation, Sports Fitness, Inc., and Peterson claims 
not to be authorized by Sports Fitness, Inc. to enter into contracts on its behalf. 
Though there may be merit to this claim, Peterson never made this point with 
Nielsen during any of the negotiations for the premises. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Nielsen asserts that the August 18,1997 lease is an enforceable contract. In 
contrast, Peterson maintains that the lease was drawn up and signed only under the 
express understanding that no contract was being formed, and that the signed 
3 
document only would be used to encourage government authorities to change the 
zoning of the property. He claims that the terms of the lease represent preliminary 
negotiations which would take official shape at a later time since he had no 
authority to act on Golds Gym's behalf (Sports Fitness, Inc.). 
For someone who had no authority, and for someone who believed he was 
under no contract obligation, Peterson did some strange things. He signed a lease, 
advertised the opening of the premises by mailing fliers to county residents, and 
spent $3,000 on specialized architectural plans. His actions suggest that even he 
believed that a deal had been reached.2 However, the Commercial Lease is 
nonetheless unenforceable for lack of mutual assent, or a meeting of the minds, as 
to the nature and extent of the property to be leased. 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is the mutual 
assent to every material term and condition set forth in the offer.3 In a contract to 
lease realty, the material terms are price, duration, and the extent and boundary of 
the property. See Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 
2
 See Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d29, 36-37 (Utah App. 1993) 
(subsequent acts determine whether parties intended to be bound by a lease agreement for real 
property - defendant intended to be bound since it entered the premises, made rental payments, 
hired an architect and contractor, and engaged in demolition). 
3
 Mutual assent is fundamental to every enforceable contract. It means that each party 
has "a definite, understandable, and unequivocal meeting of the minds upon the terms of the 
contract; that is to say, each party must agree without reservation to what he is required to do and 
to what the other party is required and expected to do." Candlandv. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101,1102 
(Utah 1926). See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372,1376 (Utah 
1995) (plaintiff must show '*the parties1 mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions"); 
Commercial Union Assocs., 863 P.2d at 36-37 ("A condition precedent to the enforcement of 
any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, 
either expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced."). 
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1952) (internal citation omitted).4 To prevail, the plaintiff must show a meeting of 
the minds on each of these terms. See Cal Wadsworth Comtr. v. City of St 
George, 898 P.2d 1372,1376 (Utah 1995) (plaintiff bears burden). 
In this case, Nielsen has failed to establish that there was an understanding 
and agreement as to the extent and boundary of the property. According to 
Nielsen, the lease only obligates him to provide Peterson with a shell, not 
improvements while Peterson claimed that Nielsen was responsible to pay for the 
improvements.5 However, the lease document itself is utterly silent on the topic of 
payment for the improvements. Yet the cost of the improvements, $168,000, is so 
large that no reasonable person can believe the parties reached an enforceable 
agreement on all essential lease terms without the contract containing a clear 
statement as to who would bear that expense.6 
4
 The court states that these are the essential terms of a contract to lease real property, 
although the case actually deals with the statute of frauds. 
5
 If anything, the document hints that it is Nielsen's obligation to pay and provide for the 
improvements. In paragraph three entitled "Care and Maintenance of Premises," the lessee is 
under an obligation to care for improvements and surrender "the same. . . in as good condition as 
received, normal wear and tear excepted/' Why have a provision in the lease that requires the 
lessee to return improvements "as received"? This suggests that the improvements were to be 
provided by Nielsen as part of the premises. 
6
 Nielsen also argues that the lease describes the property as 'the premises," and that 
"the premises" meant the space as it was at the time of the lease execution-in its unimproved 
state. In feet, however, a description of property is ambiguous if "the words used may be 
understood to support two or more plausible meanings." Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 
57,60 (Utah App. 1990). It is plausible that '^ premises" could mean a mere shell, or, a finished 
building, especially where construction of the premises was still in progress when the contract 
was executed: "Premises is an elastic and inclusive term, and it does not have one definite and 
fixed meaning; its meaning is to be determined by its context and is dependent on circumstances 
in which used, and may mean a room, shop, building, or any definite area." Blacks Law 
Dictionary, 6th ed. 
5 
Nor does extrinsic evidence establish the necessary assent. In this case 
each party conceded that improvements were not even discussed until well after the 
contract had been signed. This fact precludes the possibility that some oral 
understanding was reached at the time of contract execution as to payment for the 
improvements. Instead, Nielsen argues that Peterson's obligations stem from 
industry custom.8 He claims that absent an express provision to the contrary, 
commercial lessors only provide shells, and commercial lessees always install and 
pay for the improvements.9 He further argues that Peterson must have been aware 
of this practice, or that he was otherwise aware of his obligation to pay for the 
improvements, since Peterson paid for the architectural plans. He therefore asks 
that the court hold Peterson to the industry standard. 
However, Nielsen presented no evidence that such an industry standard 
exists. Nor does it necessarily follow from Peterson's payment of a few thousand 
7
 Nielsen insists that the contract is integrated and that no extrinsic evidence ishould be 
considered. But, having found the contract insufficient, I also look to the extrinsic evidence to 
determine whether that evidence will clariiy the issue which the contract leaves indefinite. In that 
setting, I note that when a contract for the sale or lease of land contains a property des cription 
that is susceptible to different meanings, extrinsic evidence is admissible to remove indefiniteness 
and to prove that the parties contemplated a specific meaning over another: "when a contract is 
ambiguous, because of the uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies, parol evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent." Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 
665 P.2d 1292,1293 (Utah 1983); see also Dixon, 987 P.2d at 57 C\If\ provision is gimbiguous 
. . . [e]xtrinsic evidence is therefore necessary to ascertain the parties' intentions."). Thus, if it is 
available, reference to extrinsic evidence is appropriate in this case. 
8
 This position is quite strange, since this argument-trade usage or custom-is wholly 
dependent on extrinsic evidence, which Nielsen claimed the court should not consider. 
9
 Nielsen argued at trial that in order for the lessor to be responsible for improvements, 
that feet must be "put on the contract." There is no unambiguous legal authority supporting this 
claim. 
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dollars on customized architectural plans that he obligated himself to the entire 
$168,000 in improvement costs. How those costs were to be apportioned was not 
addressed in the written agreement nor in any oral understandings of the parties.10 
Simply put, Nielsen has failed to prove that there was a meeting of the minds-a 
mutual understanding-as to the essential, material term of which party was to pay 
for the tenant improvements. Without understanding and agreement as to that 
term, Nielsen's claim that there is an enforceable agreement fails. The contract is 
unenforceable for lack of mutual assent. 
CONCLUSION 
Nielsen is not entitled to expectation damages based on the lease document. 
Pursuant to rule 4-504 Code of Judicial Administration, defendants' counsel is 
directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment of dismissal 
of the action. 
Dated this 23L day of Januaiy, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELOrW^E 
^ . V A* 
10
 While Peterson's payment for the plans has evidential valn^fiWge measure that 
value was more than neutralized when Buck Robinson of KBR Construction testified that Nielsen 
told him no agreement had yet been reached with respect to the interior improvements. 
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APPENDIX "B 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 148-143) 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C. 
Brian C. Harrison (#1388) 
Attorney for Defendants 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs-
GOLD'S GYM and TROY PETERSON, ] 
& ASSOCIATES, ] 
Defendants. 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 980405353 
JUDGE Anthony W. Schofiel< 
DIVISION NO. 10 
This matter come to trial on December 12, 2000, Plaintiff 
being present and represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen, and 
the Defendants being present and represented by his attorney, Brian 
C. Harrison, and the court having considered the argument of 
counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters its: 
Fourth i **££) 
o f t J t e h ^ ? C f a ^ « f o a u r t 
°* Utah 
deputy 
°fUtahc, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Sometime before August 18, 1997, Gold's Gym manager, Troy 
Peterson (Peterson) approached James Nielsen (Nielsen) about the 
possibility of leasing property that had been advertised for rent. 
2. On August 18, 1997, Peterson and Nielsen signed a 
document entitled "Commercial Lease" which provides that the lessor 
Nielsen leases to "Gold's Gym & Troy Peterson & Associates" "the 
premises" located in a "Strip Mall at 1341 East Center, Spanish 
Fork, Utah 84660" for $0.851 per square foot per month for three 
years. At the time of signing, the strip mall was undergoing 
construction. 
3. At the time the document was signed, the subject property 
was zoned CI, a classification that did not allow for the operation 
of a health club and gym. 
4. Shortly after it was executed, the signed lease was 
provided to the city zoning commission which granted a zoning 
change that would accommodate the operation of a gym on the 
premises. 
xThe contract actually says .85 cents. This is merely a 
typographical error and the contract should be reformed to say 
$0.85. 
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5. In September 1997, Peterson had flyers printed up and 
mailed throughout the community announcing the opening of a new 
Gold's Gym. The flyer indicated the new gym would be located in 
the strip mall described above and would be open in November 1997. 
6. Peterson met twice with John Rather/ an architect, who 
drew up plans for interior improvements according to Peterson's 
specifications. Peterson paid John Rather for these plans. 
7. The architectural plans were submitted to Buck Robinson 
of KBR construction who gave a cost estimate for the proposed 
improvements. 
8. A dispute then arose over who would pay for the tenant 
improvements. Each party wanted the other to pay the entire cost 
of the improvements. Sometime later, Nielsen offered to pay half 
of the improvements, but Peterson refused. 
9. As a result of this dispute, Gold's Gym never moved into 
the premises and paid nothing to Nielsen. 
10. When Gold's Gym neither moved in nor paid for the lease 
space, Nielsen sent a notice terminating the lease. 
11. Thereafter Nielsen and Peterson continued to negotiate 
concerning a possible lease of the premises by Gold's Gym. 
3 
i A :? 
12. Nielsen eventually rented the subject premises to another 
entity at a price of $0.11 a square foot, with six months rent 
free, and after paying a half of the tenant improvements. 
13. Nielsen now seeks expectation damages against Gold's Gym 
based on the terms of the August 18, 1997 Commercial Lease. 
14. Peterson claims he is not authorized to bind Gold's Gym 
to a contract as Gold's Gym is a dba of a Utah corporation, Sports 
Fitness, Inc., and Peterson claims not be authorized by Sports 
Fitness, Inc. to enter into contract on its behalf. Though there 
may be a merit to this claim, Peterson never made this point with 
Nielsen during any of the negotiations for the premises. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Commercial Lease is unenforceable for lack of mutual 
assent, or a meeting of the minds, as to the nature and extent of 
the property to be leased. 
2. Nielsen has failed to establish that there was an 
understanding and agreement as to the extent and boundary of the 
property. 
4 
3. Nielsen has failed to prove that there was a meeting of 
the minds - a mutual understanding- as to the essential, material 
term of which party was to pay for the tenant improvements. 
4. This matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this \\ day of (Ufllf ^J^OOl. 
Approved as to Form: 
Don R. Petersen 
5 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true cind correct 
copy of the foregoing on this 1 day of 3 ^ 4 0 . , 2 0 01, 
by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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APPENDIX "C" 
JlJDCiMI-NTOF DISMISSAL (R. 151-149) 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C. 
Brian C. Harrison (#1388) 
Attorney for Defendants 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GOLD'S GYM, and TROY PETERSON, ] 
& ASSOCIATES, ] 
Defendants. 
> JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
1 Civil No. 980405353 
1 JUDGE Anthony W. Schofiel< 
1 DIVISION NO. 10 
This matter come to trial on December 12, 2000, Plaintiff 
being present and represented by his attorney, Don R* Petersen, and 
the Defendants being present and represented by his attorney, Brian 
C, Harrison, and the court having considered the argument of 
counsel and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
c RLED 
Deputy 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Commercial Lease is unenforceable for lack of mutual 
assent, or a meeting of the minds, as to the nature and extent of 
the property to be leased. 
2. Nielsen has failed to establish that there was an 
understanding and agreement as to the extent and boundary of the 
property. 
3. Nielsen has failed to prove that there was a meeting of 
the minds - a mutual understanding- as to the essential, material 
term of which party was to pay for the tenant improvements. 
4. This matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this jl day of , 2001. JUu 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
Don R. Petersen 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing on this jA^ day of J~r{Jjf\_ / 2001, 
by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P.O, Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Secupetary " 
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APPENDIX "D 
COMMERCIAL LEASE (EXHIBIT 
<yu-ri [ ^ M / 
A14M0 COMMERCIAL LEASE 
R140-04 
This lease is made between
 J a m e s D # N i e l g e n 
of 963 East Crosswinds Dr. Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
herein called Lessor, and Golds Gym & Troy Peterson & A s s o c i a t e s Both as a
 > 0 f 
Company & i n d i v i d u a l of 1735 N S t a t e ST. Provo, UT 84606 , herein called Lessee. 
Lessee hereby offers to lease from Lessor the premises situated in the City of Spanish Fork 
.Countyof Utah .Stateof Utah .describedas 
A S t r i p Mall a t 1341 E Center Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
, upon the following TERMS and CONDITIONS: 
1. Term and Rent Lessor demises the above premises for a term of 3 years, commencing 
Nov 1 ,19 97 , and terminating on Oct. 31 ,318 2000 , or sooner as 
provided herein at the annual rental of .850 per Sq F t . per month f o r the f i r s t 3 years 
Year Bftftaffiff Year? s ) , payable in equal installments in advance on the 
first day of each month for that month's rental, during the term of this lease. All rental payments shall be made to 
Lessor, at the address specified above. 
2. Use. Lessee shall use and occupy the premises for Health Club & Gym. 
lie premises shall be used for no other purpose. Lessor represents that the premises may law-
fully be usecvfar such purpose. 
3. Care and Maintenance of Premises. Lessee acknowledges that the premises are in good order and repair, 
unless otherwise indicated herein. Lessee shall, at his own expense and at all times, maintain the premises in good 
and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system 
or equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as 
received, normal wear and tear excepted. Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required, excepting the roof, 
exterior walls, structural foundations, and: Snow removal & Landscaping maintance. 
, which 
shall be maintained by Lessor. Lessee shall also maintain in good condition such portions adjacent to the premises, 
such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by Lessor. 
4. Alterations. Lessee shall not, without first obtaining the written consent of Lessor, make any alterations, addi-
tions, or improvements, in, to or about the premises. 
5. Ordinances and Statutes. Lessee shall comply with all statutes, ordinances and requirements of all municipal, 
state and federal authorities now in force, or which may hereafter be in force, pertaining to the premises, occasioned 
by or affecting the use thereof by Lessee. 
6. Assignment and Subletting. Lessee shall not assign this lease or sublet any portion of the premises without 
prior written consent of the Lessor, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. Any such assignment or subletting 
without consent shall be void and, at the option of the Lessor, may terminate this lease. 
7. Utilities. All applications and connections for necessary utility services on the demised premises shall be made 
in the name of Lessee only, and L e w $h«" b* solely liable for utility chcrges as iaey become due, including those 
for sewer, water, gas, electricity, and telephone services. 
8. Entry and Inspection. Lessee shall permit Lessor or Lessor's agents to enter upon the premises at reasonable 
times and upon reasonable notice, for the purpose of inspecting the same, and will permit Lessor at any time within 
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this lease, to place upon the premises any u«ual 'To Let" or "For Lease" 
signs, and permit persons desiring to lease the same to inspect the premises thereafter. 
9. Possession. If Lessor is unable to deliver possession of the premises at lhe commencement hereof. Lessor shall 
not be liable for any damage caused thereby, nor shall this lease be void or voidable, but Lessee shall not be liable 
for any rent until possession is delivered. Lessee may terminate this lease if possession is not delivered within 
days of the commencement of the term hereof. 
10. Indemnification of Lessor. Lessor shall not be liable for any damage or injury to Lessee, or any other p-rron, 
or to any property, occurring on the demised premises or any part thereof, and Lessee agrees to hold Lessor harm-
less from any claims for damages, no matter how caused. 
11. Insurance. Lessee, at his expense, shall maintain plate glass and public liability insurance including bodily 
injury and property damage insuring Lessee and Lessor with minimum coverage as follows: 
Lessee shall provide Lessor with a Certificate of Insurance showing Lessor as additional insured. The 
Certificate shall provide for a ten-day written notice to Lessor in the event of cancellation or material change of cov-
erage. To the maximum extent permitted by insurance policies which may be owned by Lessor or Lessee, Lessee 
and Lessor, for the benefit of each other, waive any and all rights of subrogation which might otherwise exist. 
NOTICE: Contact your local county real estate board or Association of Realtors* for additional 
forms that may be required to meet youi specific needs. 
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12. Eminent Domain. If the premises or any part thereof or any estate therein, or any other part of the building materially affect-
ing Lessee's use of the premises, shall be taken by eminent domain, this lease shall terminate on the date when title vests pursuant 
to such taking. The rent, and any additional rent, shall be apportioned as of the termination date, and any rent paid for any period 
beyond that date shall be repaid to Lessee. Lessee shall not be entitled to any part of the award for such taking or any payment in 
lieu thereof, but Lessee may Hie a claim for any taking of fixtures and improvements owned by Lessee, and for moving expenses. 
13. Destruction of Premises. In the event of a partial destruction of the premises during the term hereof, from any cause, Lessor 
shall forthwith repair the same, provided that such repairs can be made within sixty (60) days under existing governmental laws 
and regulations, but such partial destruction shall not terminate this lease, except that Lessee shall be entitled to a proportionate 
reduction of rent while such repairs are being made, based upon the extent to which the making of such repairs shall interfere with 
the business of Lessee on the premises. If such repairs cannot be made within said sixty (60) days, Lessor, at his option, may 
make the same within a reasonable time, this lease continuing in effect with the rent proportionately abated as aforesaid, and in the 
event that Lessor shall not elect to make such repairs which cannot be made within sixty (60) days, this lease may be terminated at 
the option of either party. In the event that the building in which the demised premises may be situated is destroyed to an extent of 
not less than one-third of the replacement costs thereof, Lessor may elect to terminate this lease whether the demised premises be 
injured or not. A total destruction of the building in which the premises may be situated shall terminate this lease 
14. Lessor's Remedies on Default If Lessee defaults in the payment of rent, or any additional rent, or defaults in the perfor-
mance of any of the other covenants or conditions hereof, Lessor may give Lessee notice of such default and if Lessee does not 
cure any such default within 30 days, after the giving of such notice (or if such other default is of such nature that it 
cannot be completely cured within such period, if Lessee does not commence such curing within such 30 days and thereafter 
proceed with reasonable diligence and in good faith to cure such default), then Lessor may terminate this lease on not less than 
days' notice to Lessee. On the date specified in such notice the term of this lease shall terminate, and Lessee shall then 
quit and surrender the premises to Lessor, but Lessee shall remain liable as hereinafter provided. If this lease shall have been so 
terminated by Lessor, Lessor may at any time thereafter resume possession of the premises by any lawful means and remove 
Lessee or other occupants and their effects. No failure to enforce any term shall be deemed a waiver. 
15. Security Deposit. Lessee shall deposit with Lessor on the signing of this lease the sum of $ 1 ,000 .00 & F i r s t 
month l e a s e i n advance One Thousand Dollars ($ ) as security for the 
performance of Lessee's obligations under this lease, including without limitation the surrender of possession of the premises to 
Lessor as herein provided. If Lessor applies any part of the deposit to cure any default of Lessee, Lessee shall on demand deposit 
with Lessor the amount so applied so that Lessor shall have the full deposit on hand at all times during the term of this lease. 
16. Tax Increase. In the event there is any increase during any year of the term of this lease in the City, County or State real estate 
taxes over and above the amount of such taxes assessed for the tax year during which the term of this lease commences, whether 
because of increased rate or valuation, Lessee shall pay to Lessor upon presentation of paid tax bills an amount equal to % 
of the increase in taxes upon the land and building in which the leased premises are situated. In the event that such taxes are 
assessed for a tax year extending beyond the term of the lease, the obligation of Lessee shall be proportionate to the portion of the 
lease term included in such year. 
17. Common Area Expenses. In the event the demised premises are situated in a shopping center or in a commercial building in 
which there are common areas, Lessee agrees to pay his pro-rata share of maintenance, taxes, and insurance for the common area. 
18. Attorney's Fees. In case suit should be brought for recovery of the premises, or for any sum due hereunder, or because of any 
act which may arise out of the possession of the premises, by either party, the prevailing party shall be entitled to all costs incurred 
in connection with such action, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
19. Waiver. No failure of Lessor to enforce any term hereof shall be deemed to be a waiver. 
20. Notices. Any notice which either party may or is required to give, shall be given by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Lessee at 
the premises, or Lessor at the address specified above, or at such other places as may be designated by the parties from tine to time. 
21. Heirs, Assigns, Successors. This lease is binding upon and inures to the benefit of the heirs, assigns and successors in interest 
to the parties. 
22. Option to Renew. Provided that Lessee is not in default in the performance of this lease, Lessee shall have the option to 
renew the lease for an additional term of 60 months commencing at the expiration of the initial lease term. All of the 
terms and conditions of the lease shall apply during the renewal term except that the monthly rent shall be the sum gfjfic To Be 
The option shall be exercised by written notice given to Lessor not less than 90 days prior to the expiration of the 
initial lease term. If notice is not given in the manner provided herein within the time specified, this option shall expire. 
23. Subordination. This lease is and shall be subordinated to all existing and future liens and encumbrances against the property. 
24. Radon Gas Disclosure. As required by law, (Landlord) (Seller) makes the following disclosure: "Radon Gas" is a naturally 
occurring radioactive gas that, when it has accumulated in a building in sufficient quantities, may present health risks to persons who 
are exposed to it over time. Levels of radon that exceed federal and state guidelines have been found in buildings in 
Additional information regarding radon and radon testing may bevobtained from your county public health unit 
25. Entire Agreement. The foregoing constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and may be modified only by a writing 
signed by both partie*. The following Exhibits, if any, have been made a part of this lease before the parties, execution hereof: 
Signed this (jfW&yof August ,19 97 
*y: 
Lessor 
O E-Z LcgaTVormf. Before you use this form, read It, fill in all blacks, and make whatever changes are necessary to your particular transaction Cbnsnit a lawyer if you doubt the fern's 
^ 
Addendum To Commercial Lease dated / / August 1997 
1. Subject to the lessor being able to getting approval from Spanish Fork City rezoning 
the property from the current C-l zoning to C-2 zone. 
2. Annual prepaid rents to be $.85 per square ft per month if over 10,000 square feet are 
leased annually, otherwise the rent is to be $1.00 per square foot per month. 
3. This is to be a three year lease to have a five year option on lease after three years. 
4. Lessor to pay property tax on building. 
5. First months lease to be paid only when rezoning is complete. 
